


























































published: 18 February 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2015.00023
Motor imagery in clinical disorders: importance and
implications
Aidan Moran1*, Jessica Bramham1, Christian Collet 2, Aymeric Guillot 2,3 andTadhg Eoghan MacIntyre4
1 School of Psychology, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
2 Centre de Recherche et d’Innovation sur le Sport, Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1, Villeurbanne, France
3 Institut Universitaire de France, Paris, France
4 Department of Physical Education and Sport Sciences, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland
*Correspondence: aidan.moran@ucd.ie
Edited by:
David G. Pearson, University of Aberdeen, UK
Reviewed by:
Christopher R. Madan, Boston College, USA
Keywords: motor imagery, mental imagery, post-traumatic stress disorder, personality disorders, social anxiety disorder
One of our most remarkable mental
capacities is the ability to use our imag-
ination voluntarily to mimic or simulate
sensations, actions, and other experiences.
For example, we can “see” things in our
mind’s eye,“hear”sounds in our mind’s ear,
and imagine motor experiences like run-
ning away from, or perhaps “freezing” in
the face of, danger. Since the early 1900s
(1), researchers have investigated “mental
imagery” or the multimodal cognitive sim-
ulation process by which we represent per-
ceptual information in our minds in the
absence of sensory input (2).
Although visual imagery has attracted
most research attention to date (3), there
has been an upsurge of interest in cog-
nitive neuroscience and sport psychology
in non-visual simulation processes such
as “motor imagery” (MI) - or the men-
tal rehearsal of actions without engaging
in the physical movements involved (4).
This trend is attributable mainly to the dis-
covery of close parallels between the neu-
rocognitive mechanisms underlying imag-
ination and motor control. Specifically,
inspired by Jeannerod’s (5–7) simulation
theory of action representation, researchers
have discovered that MI recruits simi-
lar neural pathways and mechanisms to
those involved in actual movements. For
example, Hétu et al. (8) showed that the
neural network of MI includes several
cortical regions known to underlie actual
motor execution. Building on this apparent
functional equivalence between imagined
and executed actions, the present arti-
cle explores the implications of research
on MI for increased understanding of
three clinical conditions – post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), personality disor-
der, and social anxiety disorder (SAD).
Before we begin, however, some back-
ground information on imagery processes
in psychopathology is required.
Arising from Kosslyn’s proposition that
mental imagery plays “a special role in
representing emotionally charged mate-
rial” [(9), p. 405; see also Ref. (10)],
researchers have examined the role of
imagery processes in the onset, mainte-
nance, and treatment of various psycholog-
ical disorders (11–13). A consistent find-
ing is that negative, vivid, and distress-
ing involuntary (“intrusive”) imagery is
a “transdiagnostic” feature of depression
(14), SAD (15), PTSD (16), and obsessive-
compulsive disorder [OCD; (17)]. For
example, Weßlau and Steil (14) reported
that more than one in three depressed peo-
ple suffer from involuntary negative mental
imagery. Furthermore, people’s capacity to
use imagery prospectively is significantly
impaired in certain clinical disorders. Thus,
Morina et al. (18) discovered that depressed
patients were less capable of imagining
positive future outcomes than were non-
depressed controls. Imagery processes also
help in the treatment of psychopathol-
ogy. Indeed, Holmes et al. (19) evaluated
the therapeutic value of “imagery rescript-
ing” [where distressing images are modi-
fied to change their associated thoughts,
feelings, and behavior; (20)] in the treat-
ment of PTSD. Clearly, imagery research
represents “a new and important arena”
[Pearson et al. (13), p. 3] for clinical
psychology.
Despite increased awareness of imagery
processes in psychopathology, there is at
least one significant gap in research in this
field. Specifically, little is known about the
role of MI in clinical disorders. Curiously,
despite the multimodal nature of imagery
(21), clinical researchers have tended to
focus mainly on its visual component.
Thus, Weßlau and Steil (14) proclaimed
that in imagery, although “other sensory
components such as smells, sounds, or
haptic sensations . . . may be present . . . the
visual aspect is the necessary and suffi-
cient condition” (our italics, p. 274). This
proposition may be challenged, however,
by evidence that mildly to moderately
depressed patients experience proportion-
ately more somatic (39.6%) than visual
(27.2%) imagery (17). More importantly,
MI processes may help to elucidate the
mechanisms underlying clinical conditions
with distinctive motor components. For
example, Chen et al. (22) discovered that
depressed patients have difficulties in the
mental rotation of hand stimuli. These
imagery deficits reflect “an underlying
slowing down of motor preparation, which
may contribute to psychomotor retarda-
tion” (p. 341).
Let us now consider three specific disor-
ders in which MI processes are potentially
significant - PTSD, personality disorders,
and SAD.
POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
Post-traumatic stress disorder typically
involves a threat to an individual’s phys-
ical integrity [DSM-V; (23)]. This threat
may prompt movement execution either
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through resistance to attack (fight) or
through intended escape (flight) (24).
Accordingly, it seems plausible that re-
experiencing a traumatic event in the form
of “flashbacks” will involve MI. Corrobo-
rating this hypothesis, research shows that
flashbacks are associated with increases in
various types of motor behavior (25). More
recently,neuroimaging paradigms in which
individuals with PTSD imagine their trau-
matic experience or simulate flashbacks
have shown increased cerebral blood flow
to the motor cortex including the pre-
central gyrus and supplementary motor
area (26, 27). These findings shed light
on the neurocognitive mechanisms under-
lying PTSD disorders because they con-
firm the involvement of motor cortex in
the simulated re-experiencing of traumatic
events.
Another link between PTSD and MI
processes has emerged from recent studies
of the “freeze” response or tonic immobil-
ity. Briefly, tonic immobility is an involun-
tary, reflexive state, characterized by appar-
ent physical paralysis, muscular rigidity,
and inability to vocalize (28, 29). For ani-
mals, it may be a last line of defense because
it reduces the likelihood that predators will
continue to attack them (30). The freeze
response is more complex in humans, how-
ever, as it may be triggered by symbolic
events such as the perception that a sit-
uation is inescapable (31). Interestingly,
although “freezing” was first noted as a
characteristic of sexual assault (32) - with
up to 37-52% of such assault survivors
reporting tonic immobility - it has also
been identified among victims of other
traumas including physical assault and
natural disasters (33). Accordingly, tonic
immobility has been proposed as a core
sign of trauma in PTSD (34). Unfortu-
nately, peri-traumatic tonic immobility has
been shown to predict a poor response
to pharmacological treatment (35, 36) -
which suggests that psychological processes
may be especially significant in this form
of PTSD. Recently, Bovin et al. (37) dis-
covered that guilt (i.e., negative evaluation
of an action or inaction) mediated the
association between tonic immobility and
PTSD symptom severity. These authors
speculated that guilt may be a mechanism
through which individuals develop PTSD
following tonic immobility. The argument
here is that during the tonic immobility
experienced in the trauma situation, vic-
tims may feel guilty about their lack of
action – which renders them especially
vulnerable to developing PTSD. As tonic
immobilization is a key risk factor for
PTSD, interventions that are targeted to
remediate the impact of the freeze response
could provide a fruitful strategy for the
reduction or prevention of PTSD symp-
toms (36). Therefore, we propose that
rescripting based on MI (“remobilizing”)
could prove valuable as an intervention
technique for PTSD (38).
Recent studies show that tonic immobil-
ity during childhood sexual abuse is asso-
ciated with the onset of subsequent PTSD
symptomatology in adulthood (39). The
freeze response, or “learned helplessness,”
is especially likely in cases of trauma expe-
rienced by infants or young children who
are physically unable to escape (40). Fur-
ther insights into MI processes in PTSD
spring from research on the differences
between patients’ memories of traumatic
events and those of non-traumatic events.
Thus, van der Kolk and Fisler (41) sug-
gested that trauma is initially represented
using somatosensory information - with
traumatic experiences being remembered
as bodily sensations. Consistent with this
proposal, Malmo and Suzuki Laidlaw (42)
found that people who had no memory
of childhood sexual abuse prior to therapy
were “more kinesthetic than visual” in their
orientation to the world. Remarkably, dur-
ing therapy, the “no memory of trauma”
participants became aware of their trau-
matic memories, and were consistently able
to report kinesthetic memory details such
as their bodily position in relation to that
of the perpetrator (42).
PERSONALITY DISORDERS
The development of personality disorders,
particularly borderline personality disor-
der, has been strongly associated with early
trauma and neglect (43–45). Interestingly,
certain kinds of imagery rescripting such
as re-imagining adverse early childhood
events from an adult perspective have
been used to treat personality disorders
(46). Imagery rescripting was first used by
Arntz and Weertman (47) with the primary
objective of revising the perceived meaning
of events. For example, an image of a child-
hood memory might be rescripted con-
structively by imagining an adult entering
the scene and intervening in a positive
way (e.g., comforting the child concerned).
Typically, the rescripting session with the
therapist is recorded and the patient then
listens to the recording and practices the
exercise again at home, where possible
using imagery. Later, patients themselves
are required to rescript the adverse event.
Although imagery rescripting in a promis-
ing therapeutic strategy, its efficacy is medi-
ated by many psychological variables. For
example, consider the role of “imagery
perspective” or the virtual vantage point-
of-view adopted by the person imagin-
ing [e.g., first-person versus third-person
perspective; (48)]. To illustrate, one can
“feel” oneself performing an action with
one’s body (first-person perspective) or one
can “see” oneself or someone else per-
forming that action (third-person perspec-
tive). Imagery perspective is important in
the treatment of trauma because McIsaac
and Eich (49) found that traumatic images
retrieved from a third-person perspective
were experienced as less emotional than
those retrieved from a first-person per-
spective. Unfortunately, few studies have
explored the relative efficacy of different
perspectives [which may involve different
levels of embodiment (48)] in rescripting
imagery interventions.
SOCIAL ANXIETY DISORDER
Social anxiety disorder is a highly prevalent
and disabling condition that involves fear
and avoidance of interpersonal interac-
tions, particularly those that involve poten-
tial for social evaluation (50). This disorder
is typically characterized by vivid visual
imagery, particularly that generated from
a third-person perspective (51). According
to cognitive models of social anxiety [e.g.,
by Clark and Wells (52)], people with SAD
habitually generate negative images from
thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations
to create impressions of how they appear
to others from a third-person (“observer”)
perspective. Intriguingly, Spurr and Stopa
discovered that imagery experienced from
a third-person perspective is associated
with increased negative self-evaluation by
comparison with that occurring from a
first-person perspective (53).
One strategy for treating social anxi-
ety involves helping patients to restructure
their imagery experiences (54). Thus, Wild
et al. (55) developed an imagery-based
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technique to help people to modify trau-
matic memories. This technique is effec-
tive as a brief treatment for social pho-
bia (56). Its use of imagery rescripting is
similar to that pioneered by Arntz and
Weertman (47) and involves closing one’s
eyes, describing recurring images in social
situations, and then imagining that the
current self is present at the scene and
hence, intervening appropriately. This lat-
ter imagery clearly has a motor compo-
nent as it involves re-imagining actions or
movements. Accordingly, MI may be help-
ful for the treatment of SAD because it
can orient patients away from the criti-
cal self-focused perspective, thereby reduc-
ing “egocentric awareness” (57). By con-
trast, self-focused attention may impair
people’s capacity for perspective-taking,
thereby maintaining social anxiety (58).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
In this article, we have presented two main
arguments concerning imagery processes
in psychopathology. Firstly, we postu-
lated that research on MI processes offers
intriguing insights into the neurocognitive
mechanisms underlying, and psychologi-
cal treatment of, certain clinical disorders
(specifically, PTSD, personality disorders,
and SAD). In addition, we proposed that
clinical researchers have much to learn
from an emerging theoretical theme in cog-
nitive neuroscience – namely, the idea that
the brain is a dynamic predictive system
(59) which uses simulation as a mech-
anism for integrating the psychological
processes of imagination, perception, and
action. More immediately, however, sev-
eral priorities may be identified for future
research on MI in clinical disorders. Firstly,
greater theoretical and linguistic precision
is required in the delineation of differ-
ent imagery modalities and experiences.
For example, some researchers [e.g., Arntz
(46)] use the generic term “imagery” to
refer to quite different simulation phenom-
ena such as imagining bodily movements
and visualizing scenes. Secondly, in assess-
ing problems such as psychomotor retarda-
tion, clinical researchers can benefit from
the systematic use of objective measures of
MI (60) - especially recently developed psy-
chometric tests (61). Finally, on the basis
that dynamic mental practice (i.e., imagin-
ing a skill while making associated physical
movements) can improve skilled perfor-
mance through enhanced mental represen-
tation (62), it seems plausible that dynamic
imagery rescripting could enrich therapeu-
tic interventions for patients suffering from
certain disorders (e.g., PTSD).
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